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One key question for the last three decades of public management reforms is whether country 
differences between radical and modest reform approaches make a difference for performance in a 
reformed public sector. This paper compares differences in the implementation and performance of 
contracting out, i.e. private delivery of public services, between the United Kingdom and 
Scandinavia. The reform approach in the United Kingdom are argued to have generated a ‘deep’ 
contracting culture embedding stronger contracting institutions than the more ‘shallow’ contracting 
cultures in Scandinavia. Hypotheses are suggested for the role of culture, competition, contracts, 
capabilities and collaboration for contracting performance between and across the countries. 
Arguments are tested against data from on four comparable national surveys of private delivery of 
park and road maintenance services in local governments. Contracting performance is found to be 
higher in the United Kingdom due to a stronger overall combination of institutional features while 
performance differences across the countries in ranked order are found to be collaboration, 
contracts, capabilities and competition. Overall, the study support arguments in favor of a leading 
edge in radical reforming countries for some types of service settings but also prospective paths for 
catching up by more modest reforming countries.  
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A handful of countries have become international standards for measuring the scale and scope as 
well as evaluating the merits and perils of new public management (NPM) reforms and what have 
followed of post-NPM reform initiatives. In international comparisons these countries have become 
renowned as ‘vanguards’ (Hood & Dixon, 2015), ‘trailblazers’ (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007) or 
‘benchmarks’ (Barzelay, 2001) by harboring public management reforms earlier and through more 
profound and radical approaches than what can be found in other and more modest reform 
countries. One key question is whether country differences between ‘radical’ and ‘modest’ reform 
approaches make a difference for performance in a reformed public sector. However, as noted by 
Greve et al. (2016), there is a genuine lack of systematic evaluations based on quantitative 
comparative research on reform outcomes going beyond a focus on a single country, reform or 
service. This paper adds a piece to the puzzle by addressing whether one of the global cornerstones 
in the last three decades’ public management reforms, the reliance on private delivery of public 
services through contracting out, differs between radical and modest reform countries in terms of 
the strength of contracting institutions and level of contracting performance.   
 
From a broad institutionalist perspective on organization (Scott, 2001) it is argued that some 
contracting ‘cultures’ through radical reform approaches have become deeply institutionalized by 
embedding strong regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive rule systems while more modest 
reform countries embeds more shallow institutional supports for guiding contracting behaviors. The 
institutionalist perspective on contracting is refined in a set of hypotheses which link differences in 
contracting culture with differences in contracting performance.   
 
The research calls on comparative survey data on the organization and performance of private 
delivery of park and road maintenance collected in 2014-16 from local governments in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the three Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Park and 
road services are mostly organized within technical departments in local governments and often 
contracted out in some degree (Lindholst, 2009). From a theoretical perspective park and road 
services furthermore represent a ‘most-likely’ setting for successful use of contracting out due to 
compliant transactional characteristics such as relatively ease of service specification and 
measurement and relatively low requirements for specialized investments (Brown & Potoski, 2005). 
In international comparisons of public reforms, the United Kingdom is often regarded as a more 
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radical reform country with profound emphasis on marketization. In contrast, the three 
Scandinavian countries represent contexts with more incremental and modest reform approaches 
with less emphasis on marketization and greater emphasis on modernization (Greve et al., 2016). 
The research’s combination of a focus on contracting out of the same types of services across 
dissimilar national contexts should allow explorations of the importance of institutional differences 
for contracting performance.     
 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following four sections. A section on ‘Theories of 
contracting performance’ provides arguments on the importance of contracting culture and 
institutions for contracting performance. A section on ‘Methods’ described data sources, 
operationalizations, analytic tools as well as some limitations/reservations. Findings from the 
analysis is presented and discussed in a section on ‘Results and Discussions’. Finally, in the section 
‘Conclusions’ key findings are summarized and broader implications for policy and research are 
highlighted.  
 
Theories of contracting performance  
This section review mainstay arguments in the literature on the performance determinants of 
contractual governance in the private delivery of public services and provides theoretical arguments 
on the importance of contracting culture based on an institutional perspective. The section delivers 
four main hypotheses on links between contracting institutions and contracting performance.  
 
Contracting culture  
Public management reforms within different national contexts have over the years emphasized and 
implemented contracting out differently. Differences in the institutionalization of key features such 
as markets for public services, contract management capabilities, contract standards and legal 
frameworks emerges as well as a more implicit ‘contracting culture’ emerges when contracting 
practices becomes everyday routine and ‘hands-on’ tacit knowledge becomes ever more refined 
(Greve & Ejersbo, 2005). From the perspective of institutional theory (Scott, 2001) such 
‘contracting culture’ can be viewed as a multilayered institutional framework in terms of stable rule 
systems (guiding behavior) constituted by regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive systems 
ranging from the formal to the informal. In the institutional perspective a ‘deep’ contracting culture 
can be denoted as a context where the institutional framework for contractual governance not only 
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are staged as ‘artifacts’ in formal regulative systems, e.g. public policies and laws, but also woven 
into deeper layers of behavioral norms and core values as well as shared cognitive and interpretive 
schemes.  
 
UK as a deep contracting culture  
Overall, successive policies and policy learning have shaped the use of contracting out within the 
local government park and road sectors in the UK since the 1980s (Dempsey et al., 2016). In the 
1980s and 1990s, the policy framework of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) promoted the 
use of contractual governance through a set of cohesive policy instruments and a clear cost-cutting 
focus. Park and road services formed part of several core services in the early implementation of 
CCT. In particular, local governments were only allowed to provide services through in-house 
arrangements after a tightly regulated market test of service delivery. In the late 1990s, the central 
government replaced the CCT regime with the Best Value (BV) regime – a less strict policy based 
on the four principles of competition, comparison, challenge and consulting (Boyne, 1999). In 
addition, a scheme for attracting private finance for investment in public services, the private 
finance initiative (PFI), was promoted as an alternative contractual arrangement as well as new 
forms for ‘partnerships with the market’ were invented (Bovaird, 2006). Overall, a shift in focus 
from competition to collaboration in public service delivery with a variety of service providers 
where visible in the overall policy framework (Entwistle & Martin, 2005). In the late 2000s, 
‘strategic commissioning’ came to denote an even more encompassing policy approach to public 
service delivery including a focus on delivering ‘public value’ in local contexts as well as on 
thrusts, social enterprises and non-profit organizations as alternatives to provision by local 
governments and private for-profit contractors (Bovaird et al., 2014).   
 
Given the long history of successive and encompassing policies related to development of 
contractual governance as well as reliance on contracts and competition in public service delivery in 
the UK context it is argued that the country context represents a ‘deep contracting culture’ with a 
strong institutionalization of contracting in regulative as well as normative and cultural-cognitive 
systems.  
 
Shallow contracting cultures in Scandinavia 
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In general, Scandinavia, as part of the Nordic group of countries, leans toward modernization rather 
than marketization in their reform initiatives (Greve & Ejersbo, 2016). The three Scandinavian 
countries, Sweden, Norway and Denmark differs in important aspects in the degree contracting out 
has been pursued and regulated within various sectors, but in comparison to the UK they all 
represent national contexts with shorter histories, less systematic and more modest policy 
approaches to contracting out including less institutionalization of formal rules and regulations as 
well as a traditional reliance on the public sector for service provision. In Denmark, for example, 
the overall policy approach and implementation of contracting out within park and road services 
have been characterized as one of pragmatism, decentralization and incrementalism rather than 
ideology, centralization and radical reform (Lindholst et al., 2016). Similar approaches within park 
and road sector are found in Norway (Leiren et al., 2016) and Sweden (Bretzer et al., 2016). Greve 
& Ejersbo (2005) found that the contracting culture in Scandinavia has been one of ‘development’ 
compared to a ‘mature’ contracting culture in the US (another vanguard country in relation to 
marketization and privatization reforms). Learning processes are ongoing in Scandinavia where 
public purchasers, private providers and costumers learn to become more like ‘contractual men’. 
Given the policy approach the contracting culture in Scandinavia is argued to be more ‘shallow’ 
with less institutionalization of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive systems. Given the 
relatively shallow contracting culture in Scandinavia it is argued that contracting performance is 
relatively inferior in the three Scandinavian countries compared to the UK.  
 
Hypothesis (H1): Contracting performance will be higher (lower) in countries with relatively 
deeper (shallower) contracting cultures. 
 
Four contracting institutions 
This section decomposes further the contracting framework into four key institutional components 
which have been highlighted in the contracting literature and linked to contracting performance.  
 
Competition  
In the contracting literature, well-functioning and competitive markets have long been argued to be 
a key determinant for high contracting performance of both private and public delivery of public 
services (Boyne, 1998; Dehoog, 1990; Donahue, 1989; Kettl, 1993; Savas, 2000). The basic 
argument in the literature on the role of competition for contracting performance has been delivered 
6 
 
by neoclassic economics and public choice theory. In the classic public choice argument, 
competitive contexts, where governments can chose between alternative service providers based on 
prices offered through competitive markets, are believed to supply the incentives for providers to 
ensure cost-efficient service provision and reduce service expenditures. In an extended argument 
based on transaction cost theory, a shift from bureaucratic supply to markets may incur additional 
transaction costs for managing and safeguarding contracts with external service providers due to the 
risk of opportunistic behaviors. However, a situation with limited competition, e.g. dependence on a 
single supplier or a small numbers of suppliers, is still a source of more contracting hazards and 
higher transactions cost than a situation with higher levels of competition.  
 
Contracts  
Formal contracts are commonly perceived as mechanisms for governing exchanges between two or 
more contracting parties. Contracts specify rights and obligations in an exchange relation for 
contracting parties. Successful contract design contributes to maximizing the received benefits from 
an exchange relation for the contracting parties. Contracting theory argue that formal contracts 
exhibit dual functions for contracting parties as a mechanism for mitigating contractual risks as well 
as a mechanism for enabling planning and coordination (Schepker et al., 2014). The importance of 
formal contracts for contracting performance of private delivery of public services has been 
highlighted by a number of studies over the years (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010; Donahue, 1989; Kim 
& Brown, 2012; Romzek & Johnston, 2005). The degree of contract completeness, i.e. how far 
contingencies in an exchange relation can be specified and written into a formal document in 
advance, has been associated with higher contracting performance. 
 
Capabilities  
Several researchers have emphasized the pivotal role of governments’ management capabilities or 
capacity for providing services by contracts for contracting performance (Amirkhanyan et al., 2007; 
Brown & Potoski, 2003; Choi & Heinrich, 2006; Romzek & Johnston, 2002). Contracting 
capabilities are seen as necessary for overcoming various problems stemming from, for example, 
lack of competition or incomplete contracting as well as developing and managing contracts 
successfully. In the literature contracting capabilities has broadly become a reference to the 
capability or capacities to manage different phases or components of the contracting process. Kettl 
wrote of the need for governments to learn the role as ‘smart buyer’ by building the capacity to 
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know ‘what to buy’, ‘who to buy from’ and finally ‘what is bought’. Later Brown & Potoski (2003) 
divided contracting capacities into the components assessing feasibility, implementing and 
evaluating service delivery by contract while the ability to align contracts with particular 
contracting objectives and the market situation can be added from the contracting framework 
proposed by Brown et al. (2006). Yang et al. (2009) have synthesized further earlier work of 
particular Brown & Potoski (2003) and Romzek & Johnston (2002) and propose a conceptualization 
based on the four components: ‘agenda setting’, ‘formulation’, ‘implementation’ and ‘evaluation’.   
 
Collaboration 
It is a longstanding assumption within sociological theories of exchange relations that the 
collaborative orientation and the normative character of relations between exchange partners – or 
what is sometimes is discussed as ‘relational’ contracting or governance – have immense 
importance for the performance of exchange relations (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1974; Schepker et 
al., 2014). The idea has gained empirical support in several studies within a private sector context 
(Cannon et al., 2000; Poppo & Zenger, 2002) as well as a public sector context (Amirkhanyan et al., 
2010; Fernandez, 2009). In the argument institutionalization of shared collaborative behavioral 
norms allow contracting parties effectively to adapt an ongoing exchange relation (contract) to new 
needs or demands, deal with unforeseen contingencies arising from uncertainties or minimizing 
efforts to safeguard the contract from behavioral risks arising from exchange specific investments 
or incomplete contracting. Overall, stronger institutionalization of norms for collaborative behaviors 
is argued to improve contracting performance.  
 
Hypothesis two (H2): Higher levels of respectively competition (H2a), use of formal contracts in 
exchange relations (H2b), contract management capability (H2c) and collaboration (H2d) improve 
contracting performance.  
 
Contracting culture and institutions 
The paper’s key proposition is that the radical reforming countries’ development of deep 
contracting cultures results in relatively higher contracting performance than more modest 
reforming countries. In the more detailed account it can be argued that the development of a deep 
contracting culture to a large degree involves development of stronger contracting institutions 
related to higher levels of competition, contracts, capabilities and collaborative behaviors. In 
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consequence, it is argued that the hypothesized association between contracting culture and 
contracting performance is partly mediated by the institutional strength of competition, formal 
contracts, contract management capabilities and collaborative behaviors.  
 
Hypothesis (H3): The contracting institutions, in terms of competition (H3a), formal contracts 
(H3b), contract management capabilities (H3c) and collaborative behaviors (H3d) will be more 
(less) developed in deeper (shallower) contracting cultures. 
 
Hypothesis three (H4): A relatively higher (hypothesized) contracting performance in deep 
contracting cultures are (partly) mediated by higher levels of competition (H4a), use of formal 
contracts in exchange relations (H4b), contract management capability (H4c) and collaboration 
(H4d). 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the expected (hypothesized) main associations between contracting 
performance and contracting culture as well as the four contracting institutions related to 



















Figure 1. Conceptual model: Contractual performance and three causal links 
A 
Causal links and hypotheses 
H1: Link C 
H2-d: Link B 
H3a-d: Link A  
H4a-d: Link AB 
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The study relies on data from a web-based survey administered to local governments in the UK, 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway in the period 2014-2016. The survey took place as part of a larger 
research project and had a broader purpose of assessing why and how local governments use private 
and public service delivery for park and road maintenance services as well as assessing outcomes 
from the use of public and private service delivery. The survey data deliver unique comparable 
insights across four countries for phenomena where no other data sources exits.  
 
The survey was firstly developed and carried out within a Danish context and subsequently 
translated and slightly adjusted for use in the three other countries. Pre-tests and adjustment were 
carried out in all country contexts. The setup of the survey and data collection in each country 
followed the same basic procedure. Small adjustments were made such as the number of reminders 
and the period for data collection as well as the number and formulation of survey items (see 
appendix for translated formulations). While translations of items where sought kept as comparable 
in their meaning the items also had to be formulated in order to be as clear and understandable by 
respondents within each country.  
 
Targeted primary respondents were midlevel managers in local government organizations with 
responsibilities for roads and/or park services with expected insights in operational dimensions as 
well as strategic dimensions of park and/or road services. List of respondents and contact details 
was collected by local research partners in each country through a combination of contact with 
professional associations, use of phone books for professionals, as well as inspection of websites 
and direct phone contact. Due to variations in internal organization it was in some cases necessary 
to identify more than one respondent for some municipalities. Initial invitations were followed up 
by multiple reminders for partly and non-responding local governments. In case that data from more 
than one respondent were received for a local government the characteristics of respondents were 
inspected. Selection of data for the local government in these instances was based on assessment of 
years of employment, job title, and responsibilities and organizational position of respondents.  
 
The final and full dataset includes data for 122 out of 391 local authorities in the UK (equal to 31 
%), 115 out of 290 municipalities in Sweden (40 %), 75 out of 98 municipalities in Denmark (77 
%) and 95 out of 490 municipalities in Norway (22 %). Drop-out analyses show that smaller local 
governments are underrepresented in all countries except Denmark. Non-response in Norway and 
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Sweden are likely to be due to high number of small municipalities (e.g. less than 10,000 
inhabitants) with relatively few or no park and road responsibilities.  
 
Not all local governments use private contractors for delivery of park and road maintenance 
services, thus the dataset for analysis builds on a subset of the full dataset. A total of 308 local 
governments indicated that they used private contractors to some degree for parks and/or road 
services including 70 UK, 77 Norwegian, 75 Danish and 86 Swedish local governments. One-
hundred and fifty-five out of the 308 local governments contained data for private delivery of both 
park and road maintenance while 153 entries contained data for either park or road maintenance. 
The 155 local governments with unique data for private delivery of both park and road maintenance 
could therefore be split into a case for parks and a case for roads. The initial data set for analysis of 
private delivery contained a total of 463 cases. Exclusion of cases with missing values for survey 
items used for constructs in the main analysis reduced the number of cases to a total of 304 (before 
outlier diagnosis) of which 62 cases were from the UK 61 from Norway, 94 from Denmark and 87 
from Sweden.  
 
Operationalizations 
The dependent or outcome variable for contracting performance is operationalized through a four 
item composite construct. The variable is based on a multidimensional conceptualization of 
performance measured through respondents’ (public managers) perceived satisfaction with key 
performance dimensions of private delivery of respectively park and road maintenance. The 
operationalization reflects similar approaches used in earlier studies of contracting performance in 
the public (e.g. Fernandez, 2009) and private sector (e.g. Cannon et al, 2000; Poppo and Zinger, 
2002) where the number of items ranges from three to eight. The operationalization in the analysis 
includes four dimensions for evaluating contractual performance which are measured by an 11-
point numeric scale with the two end anchors ‘very unsatisfied’ (0) and ‘very satisfied’ (10). The 
performance dimensions include items for: 1) service quality, 2) cost/pricing, 3) flexibility for 
change/improvements and 4) responsiveness to issues and deficiencies (see appendix for 
formulation for survey items). Reliability of the construct is high measured by Cronbach Alpha (α = 
.898) and by principal component analysis (Eigenvalue = 3.07 with 77 % of total inter-item 
variance explained). For scaling the composite construct for contracting performance the aggregated 




The analysis includes four constructs for respectively, competition, contracts, capabilities and 
collaboration as key explanatory variables. In addition four country variables are included together 
with three control variables.   
 
The variable for competition is based by a single survey item. The item measures a respondent’s 
perception of the degree in which the local government receives sufficient qualified bids 
(competition) when (park and/or road) services are tendered to the market. The measurement scale 
used an 11-point numeric scale with the two end anchors ‘not at all’ (0) and ‘in very high degree’ 
(10). The scale is treated as continuous in the analysis.  
 
A composite construct for measurement of the level of formalized contracts within a local 
government’s exchange relations with their private contractors were based on six survey items (see 
appendix for formulations). Earlier research has emphasized congruent contractual characteristics 
but operationalizations vary greatly in both content and the number of items across studies. (Cannon 
et al., 2000), for example, utilize three items to measure 'legal bonds’, (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010) 
utilize weight items to measure ‘completeness’ while (Fernandez, 2009)  utilizes one item for a 
measure of ‘specificity’. With similar purposes to gauge the level of completeness/specificity/legal 
bounds in exchange relations, but also ensure a close match with the service context of the study, 
the survey items were primarily inspired from findings in a study of the contractual infrastructure 
used in maintenance contracts in public parks and green spaces (Lindholst, 2009). The items were 
measured by an 11-point numeric scale with the two end anchors ‘not at all’ (0) and ‘in very high 
degree’ (10). For scaling the composite construct the aggregated score for the items were divided by 
the number of items. Inter-item reliability of the construct is high measured by Cronbach Alpha (α 
= .825) and acceptable measured by principal component analysis (Eigenvalue = 3.24 with 54 % of 
total inter-item variance explained). A more complex operationalization of contracts based on two 
constructs derived from principal component analysis of altogether eight survey items was also 
possible. The one construct option was favored for keeping the analysis relatively simple and 
parsimonious with regard to the importance of contracts. The two construct option would mainly 




The measure for contract management capacity is a composite construct based on four survey items. 
What is here understood as contract management capabilities has been labelled, conceptualized and 
operationalized fairly different in various survey based studies (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010; 
Fernandez, 2009). The concept may encompass very different and specific managerial activities 
such as drafting documents, evaluating tenders or monitoring contractors. The formulations in the 
survey have a more general orientation by referring to organizational concepts such as ‘systems’, 
‘methods’, ‘procedures’, ‘expertise’ or ‘time’ for managing contracts. The items were measured by 
an 11-point numeric scale with the two end anchors ‘not at all’ (0) and ‘in very high degree’ (10). 
For scaling the composite construct the aggregated score for the items were divided by the number 
of items. Inter-item reliability of the construct is high measured by Cronbach Alpha (α = .858) and 
by principal component analysis (Eigenvalue = 2.85 with 71 % of total inter-item variance 
explained). 
 
Collaboration within contractual relations has been conceptualized and operationalized slightly 
differently in earlier research and furthermore partly been associated with trust between contracting 
parties. Cannon et al (2000) used six items to measure ‘cooperative norms’, Poppo & Zinger (2002) 
used three items to measure ‘relational governance’ while Amirkhanyan et al. (2010) ended up with 
20 items measuring ‘current relationship strength’. The survey included altogether six items 
primarily adapted from Cannon et al (2000). However, the final measure for collaboration is a 
composite construct based on three survey items. One item performed relatively poorly in a 
composite construct while two items related to trust were omitted for theoretical reasons. A measure 
of trust can be argued to problematic in terms of reverse causality in relation to a measure of 
performance, i.e. trust may be a consequence of past performance as well as trust may enhance 
performance as suggested by for example Lamothe & Lamothe  (2012). The items in the construct 
for collaboration were measured by an 11-point numeric scale with the two end anchors ‘not at all’ 
(0) and ‘in very high degree’ (10). For scaling the composite construct the aggregated score for the 
items were divided by the number of items. Inter-item reliability of the construct is high measured 
by Cronbach Alpha (α = .882) and by principal component analysis (Eigenvalue = 2.45 with 82 % 





A dichotomous variable for sector is included as a simple control for differences in respondents’ 
performance evaluation of private delivery of respectively park and road maintenance. The survey 
included separate items for measuring performance within the two sectors. Statistical tests showed 
that performance differences were negligible or non-existing for individual items as well as 
composite constructs.  
 
Local government size was included as a second control. Earlier studies of contracting out have 
included measures for local government size for various purposes. In studies of differences in 
contracting levels it has been argued that relatively larger local governments should be expected to 
contract out a greater share of their services as they are likely to entertain larger markets and attract 
more competition – a precondition for well-working use of contracting out. Larger local 
governments also represent larger organizations which can devote more resources and entertain 
greater managerial and administrative specialization. Larger municipalities should therefore retain 
greater capability for managing various tasks including contracts. Theoretically speaking, local 
government size is expected to be correlated with higher levels of contract management capabilities 
and competition. The inclusion of a variable in the analysis for local government size should 
therefore moderate the size of the direct effect on performance from capabilities and competition. 
The control is also important as the size of local governments differs greatly among the four 
countries. The size of local government is measured by the number of inhabitants in 2014. Data for 
this variable were drawn from national statistical services in each of the four countries. The 
distribution of the data for the four countries combined is highly right-skewed (i.e. a small group of 
local governments account for disproportionate large numbers of inhabitants) and the data is 
transformed to a natural logarithmic scale for use in the analysis.  
 
Finally, a control was included for potential influence of systematic differences or bias in 
performance evaluation by respondents with different organizational interests. The control is based 
on a survey item addressing whether a respondent’s department had responsibilities for internal 
service provision (yes or no). The variable aims to control for any differences in performance 
evaluations from respondents with likely different interests or reference for evaluation arising from 
a status as responsible for internal service provision. Respondents employed in departments with 
direct (operational) responsibilities for internal provision of services may systematically evaluate 
14 
 
the performance of their direct competitors (i.e. private providers) differently than respondents in 
departments where no such competition exists.  
 
Analysis 
The analysis is based on computation of several statistics. SPSS was used as main software package 
for computation of statistics. The statistics guide the evaluation of the main hypothesis (H1–H4) 
presented in the theory section. In an initial sequential outlier diagnosis based on a regression 
analysis with complete data for all included variables (n = 304) identified altogether six ‘influential 
outliers’. The data for the six outliers were inspected and no (visible) erroneous data were found. 
The outliers were removed and the 298 cases are used as basis for all analysis and statistics in the 
result section. The six outliers are interpreted as a distinct group of cases with a ‘deviant’ pattern 
contrasted to the ‘normal’ pattern emerging in the analysis of the remaining 298 cases. Key 
differences between the two groups are presented and discussed as part of the result section.  
 
In the result section the data is firstly explored by descriptive statistics and comparisons of country 
differences for all key variables. The UK is used as a reference country in comparisons with the 
three Scandinavian countries individually and combined. Statistical significance of differences is 
tested by one-way anova analysis with post hoc tests. 
 
Secondly, the data is explored in a main analysis based on two ordinary least square (OLS) multiple 
regression analyses. In a first model (the ‘main analysis’), the UK is used as a reference country for 
comparison of country differences, i.e. the analysis includes dummy variables for each of the three 
Scandinavian countries. In a second model a single dummy variable for the UK replaced the three 
dummy variables for Scandinavia. The two models show corresponding results.  
 
Thirdly, because a degree of correlation exists between the independent variables, additional 
statistics are reported to assist the interpretation of the estimates and findings in the OLS 
regressions (Nathans et al., 2012). Squared structure coefficients (rs
2
) and relative weights (RW and 
RW %) were calculated for these purposes. In light of the multi-correlational character of most real 
life data, structure coefficients estimate effects from a predictor variable on the predicted values of 
the outcome variable, help assessing the degree of overall shared variance among predictor 
variables and identifying suppressor variables when compared to beta weights. According to 
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Tonidandel & LeBreton (2011), relative weights perform far better than regression weights when 
partitioning variance in the presence of correlated independent variables. Relative weights help 
identifying the contribution of predictor variables to the explained variance (R
2
) in a regression 
model by minimizing impacts from multicollinearity. The computation of additional statistics is 
based on a SPSS syntax provided by Lorenzo-Seva et al. (2010).  
 
Fourthly, a mediation analysis is carried out in order to assist in the evaluation of hypothesis H1 and 
H3. The mediation analysis evaluate whether the hypothesized effect from the UK context on 
contracting performance are indirectly effected (mediated) by differences in competition, contracts, 
capabilities or collaboration or the effect is a genuine ‘direct’ effect. The analysis is based on a 
SPSS software package and guidelines for mediation analysis provided by Hayes (2013).  
 
Reservations 
The study is based on a research design combining cross-sectorial survey data from four countries 
with correlational analysis (except data for one control variable) for explanatory purposes. Claims 
toward causality based on the present (nonexperimental) research design must be regarded as 
‘weak’ in comparison with ‘stronger’ (quasi-)experimental research designs. For example, causal 
claims might be (partly) spurious due to omitted ‘third’ variables or causality may be (partly) 
reversed.  
 
Research based on survey data may suffer from several methodological biases (Podsakoff et al., 
2012). Potential biases were sought minimized through ex ante remedies as well as post hoc tests 
were carried out to gauge eventual influence of any substantial amount of common method 
variance. Ex ante remedies in the design phase included adoption of different response scales for 
items used for constructing the predictor and response variables, the design and exact wording of 
survey items included input from separate test pilots in all countries, respondents were selected due 
to their supposed insights in the survey’s main topic, and the survey was carried out with anonymity 
and confidentiality at both the level of respondents and municipalities.  
 
Subjective measures may be biased by the identity and interest of the respondent. A small control is 
included in the analysis in order to gauge whether organizational interests, in terms of the 
respondents’ belonging to a department with direct operational responsibilities, systematically 
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influence the evaluation of contracting performance. Respondents belonging to a department with 
direct operational responsibilities are likely to be in a situation with direct or indirect competition 
with private delivery of similar services.  
 
The influence from likely confounding ‘third’ variables was gauged by inclusion of additional 
variables in alternative OLS regression models (not shown). The inclusion did, however, not alter 
main findings in the analysis. However, some variables had explanatory power. In particular, the 
level of contracting out (self-reported percentage of budgets spend on private contractors) were 
found to be associated with higher performance in simple models with few variables but not when 
controlled for levels of competition and formal contracts.  
 
Harman’s single factor test and a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) were carried out as post hoc 
tests to diagnose for any severe influence from common method variance. In the Harman’s single 
factor test all survey items from the five main variables were loaded into an exploratory factor 
analysis with direct oblimin as rotation method. The analysis resulted in four factors with 
eigenvalues larger than 1 explaining 66 per cent of the total variance whereof the first factor 
explained 33 per cent (of total variance). In the rotated solution all items had high primary loadings 
into their respective constructs and low loadings on other constructs (indicative of good construct 
validity). According to criteria for acceptable model fit given by Hu and Bentler, (1999) the results 
from the CFA (SPSS AMOS) showed that the items provided a poor fit when loaded into a single 
factor model: χ
2
 =1377.672 (df = 135, p <0.000, χ
2
 /df  = 10.205); SRMR=0.1325; RMSEA=0.176; 
PCLOSE=0.000; CFI=0.560; TLI=0.501. The post hoc statistics indicate that a substantial amount 




Table 1 shows simple descriptives for all variables at country level and at the aggregate level as 
well as results from significance test of country differences based on UK as the reference country.  
 
In comparison, the differences in mean scores for contracting performance turns out as initially 
expected. The mean score is highest for the UK (7.7) and lowest for Sweden (6.9). While the mean 
scores for the three Scandinavian countries are close to similar, the performance differences 
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between UK and each of three Scandinavian countries are found to be statistically significant for 
Sweden and Norway while insignificant for Denmark. Furthermore a significance test of the 
difference for contracting performance for the UK and all three Scandinavian countries combined 
(n=238; mean score = 7.0) finds that the difference is significant (p < .001). Overall, the direct 
comparisons build some support for the first hypothesis on relatively superior contracting 
performance in countries with deep contracting cultures versus countries with shallow contracting 
cultures. However, the direct comparison do not say much about whether the differences can be 
attributed to different contracting cultures or whether they can be accounted for by differences in 
micro-level institutions.   
 
Findings from a direct comparison of country differences for each of the four micro-level 
determinants are mixed. The UK has the highest mean scores for contracts and capabilities and 
partly for collaboration. However, Denmark has the highest mean score for competition (7.2) while 
the UK has the second lowest mean score (5.6) very close to Norway with the lowest score (5.5). 
The direct comparisons indicate partial support for the assumption that a deeper contracting culture 
embeds stronger micro-level institutions. Apparently, all countries have almost similar levels of 
collaboration while ensuring competition might have become an issue in the UK. However, the 
estimated standard deviation for competition in the UK indicates that local governments experience 
very different competition levels, i.e. some local governments attracts high levels of competition 
while other experience highly insufficient levels. If the UK is compared to all Scandinavian 
countries as one group (n=238) the mean difference for competition (-0.9), contracts (0.6) and 
capabilities (1.1) are all significant (p < 0.05) while the mean difference for collaboration (0.3) 
remains insignificant (p = .192). The direct comparisons indicate that the four micro-level 
determinants (if they work as expected) have diverging effects on the performance differences 
between the UK and the three Scandinavian countries. For example, holding the competition level 





Table 1. Descriptive statistics and mean differences 
 N Mean a S.D 
Contracting performance (index, four items) 
Measure: 11-point scale (0 = very unsatisfied, 10 = very satisfied). 
 UK 60 7.7 1.9 
 Norway 60 7.0 * 1.4 
 Denmark 92 7.2 1.3 
 Sweden 86 6.9 ** 1.5 
 ALL 298 7.2  1.4 
Competition level (single item) 
Measure: 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = In very high degree) 
 UK 60 5.6 3.2 
 Norway 60 5.5  2.9 
 Denmark 92 7.2 *** 2.1 
 Sweden 86 6.6 2.6 
 ALL 298 6.4  2.7 
Contract level (index, six items) 
Measure: 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = In very high degree) 
 UK 60 7.5 1.7 
 Norway 60 6.8 2.0 
 Denmark 92 7.1 1.9 
 Sweden 86 6.5 ** 2.4 
 ALL 298 7.0  2.0 
Contract management capability (index, four items) 
Measure: 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = In very high degree) 
 UK 60 7.4 1.4 
 Norway 60 5.6 *** 2.1 
 Denmark 92 6.9 1.6 
 Sweden 86 6.1 *** 2.1 
 ALL 298 6.5  1.9 
Collaborative relation (index, three items) 
Measure: 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = In very high degree) 
 UK 60 7.9 1.8 
 Norway 60 7.9 1.5 
 Denmark 92 7.6 1.3 
 Sweden 86 7.3 1.8 
 ALL b 298 7.7 1.6 
Internal provider 
Measure: (Dummy) 1 = yes, 0 = no 
 UK 60 0.7 0.5 
 Norway 60 0.8 0.4 
 Denmark 92 0.6 0.5 
 Sweden 86 0.8 0.3 
 ALL c 298 0.7  0.5 
Sector  
Measure: 1 = parks, 0 = roads 
 UK 60 0.7  0.5 
 Norway 60 0.3 *** 0.5 
 Denmark 92 0.4 *** 0.5 
 Sweden 86 0.3 *** 0.4 
 ALL  298 0.4  0.5 
Municipal size  
Measure: logarithmic scale (natural) 
 UK 60 12.0 0.6 
 Norway 60 9.3 *** 1.4 
 Denmark 92 10.9 *** 0.7 
 Sweden 86 10.2 *** 1.0 
 ALL 298 10.6 *** 1.4 
The table shows descriptive statistics and results from analysis of mean differences for variables included in the main analysis (N = 298). 
a  Significance levels reported for mean difference between the UK and the three Scandinavian countries. Differences tested by ONE-WAY ANOVA with post hoc 
tests (Turkey / Games-Howell). Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
b While no significant mean differences are found between UK and each of the three Scandinavian countries there can be identified a significant difference between 
Norway and Sweden (p-level < .1).  
c While no significant mean differences are found between UK and each of the three Scandinavian countries there can be identified a significant difference between 
Norway and Denmark (p-level < .05).  
 
Main analysis 
Table 2 shows overall results from the analysis from two OLS multivariate regression analysis. The 
first model in regression analysis includes a comparison of performance differences between each 
of the three Scandinavian countries and the UK. The second model compares the performance 
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difference between the UK and the three Scandinavian countries combined. Overall no substantial 
difference in results or interpretations emerges from the two models. Table 3 reports auxiliary 
statistics on the contributions of each predictor variable to regression effects and variance. Table 4 
shows results from the mediation analysis of contracting performance in UK. Table 5 provides a 
brief comparison of the characteristics of ‘deviant’ cases and ‘normal’ (groups based on outlier 
analysis). 
 
Overall the results in the two OLS-regressions reported in Table 2 build further support for the 
hypothesis that contracting performance is higher in the deep contracting culture of the UK 
compared to the shallow contracting cultures in the three Scandinavian countries. All regression 
coefficients (b) for the three Scandinavian countries are negative in model 1, the coefficient for UK 
is positive in model 2 while all associations are significant at p-levels < 0.05. The findings provide 
support for hypothesis H1.  
Table 2. OLS-regressions: Determinants of contracting performance for road and park services in four countries 
Independent variables (scales) 
Model 1 Model 2 
B SE P B SE P 
UK, dummy (yes=1, no=0)    0.525 0.208 0.012 
Norway, dummy  (yes=1, no=0) ─0.671 0.292 0.022    
Denmark, dummy (yes=1, no=0) ─0.534 0.217 0.014    
Sweden, dummy (yes=1, no=0) ─0.506 0.241 0.037    
Competition level (scale: 0–10) 0.066 0.026 0.013 0.068 0.026 0.009 
Formal contract level (scale: 0–10) 0.139 0.036 0.000 0.136 0.035 0.000 
Contract mgmt. capability (scale: 0–10) 0.152 0.040 0.000 0.157 0.039 0.000 
Collaborative relation (scale: 0–10) 0.424 0.046 0.000 0.418 0.045 0.000 
Controls 
Sector (parks=1,  roads=0) ─0.100 0.138 0.467 ─0.092 0.137 0.502 
Internal provider, dummy (yes=1, no=0) ─0.009 0.149 0.950 ─0.019 0.148 0.899 
Municipal size  (LN)  ─0.073 0.070 0.303 ─0.055 0.064 0.389 
Model summary 
Constant 2.790 0.921 0.003 2.076 0.725 0.005 
Max VIF 3.165 a 1.670 
R2 / Adj. R2  0.471 / 0.452 0.469 / 0.455 
N = 298. Six influential outliers removed in two steps with standardized residuals > -3.00 in final analysis. Analysis in model 1 without removal of 
influential outliers (n = 304) shows a significant negative beta-coefficient (-0.142) for municipal size (p < 0.1), slightly higher p-values for all 
Scandinavian countries and a slightly lower adj. R2 = 0.402.  
a The maximal value for variance inflation factor (VIF) are related to the relatively smaller number of inhabitants in local governments in Norway 
(and partly Sweden) compared to the United Kingdom.  
 
The hypothesized association (H2a-d) between higher levels of respectively competition, contracts, 
capability and collaboration and higher level of contracting performance are also supported. All 
regression coefficients for the four variables for contracting institutions are positive and three of the 
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four associations are significant at p-levels < 0.000 while the last association is significant at p-level 
= 0.013 (in model 1). The respective results for four variables provide support for hypothesis H2a-
d. 
 
Analysis of the statistics in Table 3 provides further insights into the findings from the analysis of 
regression coefficients (B) and significance of associations in model 1 in Table 2. Overall it was 
found that the predictor variables together account for a good amount of the variance in contracting 
performance (R
2 = 
0.471). However, the statistics for relative weights indicate that while country 
differences all are significant they only account for very little of the explained variance in 
contracting performance in the multivariate analysis. In total the three Scandinavian countries 
account for less than 5 % of the explained variance (RW %). In a separate calculation or relative 
weights (full stats not shown) based on the variables in model 2 (see table 2) it is congruently found 
that the UK compared to the three Scandinavian countries combined accounts for 4.3 per cent of the 
explained variance. 
 
Table 3.  Statistics determining contributions to regression effects and explained variance.  
Variable β rs rs
2 r RW RW % 
Norway ─0.175 ─0.091 0.008 ─0.062 0.008 1.6 
Denmark ─0.161 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.005 1.1 
Sweden ─0.149 ─0.169 0.029 ─0.116 0.010 2.1 
Competition  0.117 0.345 0.119 0.237 0.028 5.9 
Contract  0.185 0.578 0.334 0.397 0.077 16.4 
Capability 0.192 0.645 0.416 0.443 0.094 19.9 
Collaboration 0.447 0.867 0.752 0.593 0.244 51.8 
Sector ─0.032 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.1 
Internal provider ─0.003 ─0.067 0.004 0.046 0.001 0.2 
Municipal size  ─0.063 0.202 0.041 0.139 0.005 1.0 
Statistics: β = standardized regression coefficient,  rs = structure coefficient, rs
2 = Squared structure coefficient, r = zero-order correlations 
(Pearson’s), RW (%) = relative weight (% of explained variance). R2 = 0.471 (equal to sum of RWs).  
 
The variables for competition, contracts, capability and collaboration account for substantially 
larger amounts of the explained variance in contracting performance. Overall, the analysis of the 
contributions of each predictor to the explained variance in contracting performance shows that the 
variance in some predictors is relatively more important than the variance in other variables. 
Evaluated by statistics for respectively β, rs
2 
and RW%, the most important predictors for 
explaining the observed variance in contracting performance in ranked order are collaboration, 
capability, contracts and competition. This finding can be further detailed by inspection of the 
variance for each predictor variable given by estimates for standard deviations in Table 1. For 
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example, the relatively high variation in competition (standard deviation = 2.7) matters less for 
explaining performance than the relatively lower variation in collaboration (standard deviation = 
1.6). The variance in contracting performance is less sensitive to the relatively more extreme 
differences in the level of competition than the relatively smaller differences in the level of 
collaboration. In other words, good collaboration looks to be more important for contracting 
performance than good competition.  
 




with regression weights (β) for 
the three countries variables shows a degree of suppressor effect for all three variables. The 
suppressor effect is strongest for Denmark (rs
2
 = 0.000 and β =-0.161). The statistics tell that if one 
or more of the three dummy variables is dropped from the analysis the regression effects will be 
reduced for other variables in the analysis (but not which variables). However, in this case it is clear 
that if, for example, Denmark is dropped the dummy variables for Norway and Sweden will be 
comparing contracting performance in the two countries with a groups of cases from both Denmark 
and the UK (and similar if one of the other country variables are dropped).  
 
The estimated effects for respectively competition, contracts, capabilities and collaboration are all 
significant (in the relevant models). The general patterns are that higher levels of competition, 
formalized contracts in exchange relations, contract management capabilities, and shared norms for 
collaborative behaviors are associated with higher contracting performance.  
 
Mediation analysis 
Mediation effects with UK as a predictor of contracting performance were calculated in one 
analysis with four mediators included in parallel together with three controls. Confidence intervals 
(CI) for evaluating significance of mediation effects were calculated at a 90 per cent level based on 
a bootstrap sample of 5,000. The main results from the mediation analysis are presented in Table 4.  
 
Overall, the analysis of potential mediation effects finds that the total mediation effect from the four 
variables combined does not change the finding that the UK context contributes in a unique way to 
explaining variance in contracting performance in the UK and Scandinavia. The decrease in the 
coefficient for UK from .663 to .525 indicates a partial mediation effects from all four mediating 
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variables combined. The total indirect effect (.138) of all four mediating variables, however, is 
found insignificant by calculation of a 90 per cent CI (-.166 / .434). 
 
Table 4.  Mediation effect analysis with UK as predictor of contracting performance (CP) 
Mediators (M) 
a path 
(UK → M) 
b path 
(M → CP) 
 Indirect effect 
(UK →  M → CP) 
CI90% lower / 
upper  
(indirect effect) 
Effect size  
(ratio of total 
effect)  
CI90% lower / 
upper  
(effect size) 
Contracts  .165 (p= .661) .136 (p= .001) .022 -.044 / .108 .034 -.093 / .174 
Competition -2.047 (p< .000) .068 (p= .024) -.139 -.277 / -.050 -.210 -.848 / -.059 
Capabilities .432 (p= .112) .157 (p= .001) .068 .004 / .167 .102 .008 / .299 
Collaboration .449 (p= .123) .418 (p< .000) .188 .004 / .401 .238 .020 / .683 
Total c path .663 (p= .013) .138 -.166 / .434 .209 -.414 / .603 
N = 298. All reported regression coefficients are unstandardized. Direct effect of UK on contracting performance (c’ path) = .525 (p. = .016). 
Confidence intervals (CI) calculated with bootstrapping (5,000 samples). A sensitivity analysis based on a 95% CI finds that only competition remains 
a significant mediator.   
 
Going beyond the total indirect effect, a significant degree of partial mediation is found for three 
out of the four mediating variables. For capabilities, the analysis finds a significant indirect effect of 
UK context on contracting performance through capabilities, indirect effect = 0.068, CI90% (0.004 
/ 0.167). Capabilities mediate about one tenth of the total effect of UK on contracting performance 
(effect size = 0.102). For collaborative behaviors, the analysis finds a significant indirect effect of 
UK context on contracting performance through collaborative behaviors, indirect effect = 0.188, 
CI90% (0.004 / 0.401). Collaboration mediates about one quarter of the total effect of UK on 
contracting performance (Effect size = 0.238). For competition, the analysis finds a significant 
indirect effect of UK context on contracting performance through competition, indirect effect = –
0.139, CI90% (–0.277 / –0.050). Competition accounts for one-fifth of the total effect of UK on 
contracting performance (effect size = –0.210). The mediation effect is negative (inconsistent 
mediation) and partly cancels out effects from other mediating variables. Finally, the analysis shows 
that contracts do not function as a mediating variable indirect effect = –0.022 CI90% (–0.044 / 
0.108).  
 
The findings equal to say that the relatively higher performance in the UK compared to Scandinavia 
partly is explained by higher levels of capabilities (support for H4c) and collaborative behaviors 
(support for H4d). However, the relatively higher performance in UK is also limited by a relatively 
lower degree of competition (no support for H4a) in the UK compared to Scandinavia while the 





The relatively higher contracting performance in the UK compared to Scandinavia is partly 
accounted for by more robust institutionalization of collaborative behaviors (one-quarter of total 
effect) and contract management capabilities (one-tenth of the total effect). However, contradictory 
to initial expectations competition is relatively lower in the UK and the mediation effect of 
competition (one-fifth of the total effect) cancels out a part of the indirect effects of collaborative 
behaviors and contract management capabilities. Overall, the findings from the mediation analysis 
only bring partly support for H4.  
 
Interpreting outliers as ‘big failures’ 
Six outliers were excluded in the main analysis by their highly deviant reported values for 
contracting performance compared to expected values in the model (all identified by standardized 
residuals larger than -3.00). By further inspection and qualitative assessment of data and 
background information the data for outlier cases are suggested to be, not erroneous, but 
representative for a qualitatively different type of case where contractual governance severely fails 
or underperform. Outliers were identified across all country contexts. 
 
Table 5. Comparing key characteristics of ‘outlier’ and ‘normal’ case groups 
Case  Performance Competition Contracts Capability Collaboration Size (LN) 
Normal (298) 7.2 (1.4) 6.4 (2.7) 7.0 (2.0) 6.5 (1.9) 7.7 (1.6) 10.6 (1.4) 
Outliers (6) 2.3 (1.5) 7.3 (3.1) 7.6 (2.0) 5.8 (2.8) 6.9 (1.9) 11.7 (1.0) 
ALL (304) 7.1 (1.7) 6.4 (2.8) 7.0 (2.0) 6.5 (2.0) 7.6 (1.6) 10.6 (1.3) 
Note: The table reports means and standard deviations (in brackets) between cases in the outlier group (std. residuals larger than -
3.00) and ‘normal’ cases included in the main analysis. Mean differences are (only) statistically significant (p < 0.1) for performance 
and size (LN) SPSS ONE-WAY ANOVA with post-hoc tests. 
 
Table 5 compares key characteristics and performance evaluations in the group of ‘normal’ cases 
with the groups of ‘deviant’ outlier cases. The group of outliers consists mainly of cases of large 
municipalities with relatively favorable characteristics related to competition, contracts, capacity 
and collaboration but still reporting severe contract failures. From the average performance 
evaluation in the group of outlier cases (score = 2.0) it is indicated that these local governments 
have had exceptionally disappointing experiences with private service delivery.  
 
The differentiation between a normal and deviant group of cases leads to the finding (by 
interpretation) that contractual governance has a ‘business-as-usual baseline’ where it works 
routinely as predicted (by theory), but can be disrupted by ‘big failures’ (like buying a ‘lemon car’). 




The particular reasons for performance problems in the outlier cases cannot be empirically assessed 
further in the analysis. The problems might reflect severe ‘adverse selection’ or ‘moral hazards’ 
problems apparently hard to mitigate albeit having relatively good contracting institutions in place. 
Indication is given in Table 3 that possessing good contract management capabilities and embarking 
on a collaborative approach in exchange relations may be more important for higher contracting 
performance than being a large local government, having formal contracts in place and being within 
competitive markets.  
 
Summary of key findings 
Overall, the analysis finds that reformed service provision in a country with a deep contracting 
culture in comparison with more modest reform countries with more shallow produce superior 
results – at least within a most-likely setting for a reform instruments. The findings in the analysis 
support the first hypothesis (H1).   
 
The findings for links between performance and respectively collaboration, capacity, contracts and 
competition across local governments in the UK and the three Scandinavian countries are all 
congruent with key notions in different parts of the contracting literature. Overall, the second main 
hypothesis including sub-hypotheses (H2a-d) is supported by findings in the analysis. Interestingly, 
collaborative behaviors are found to be far more important for explaining variations in contracting 
performance than competition. 
 
The analysis of differences in the strength of contracting institutions shows that the UK has 
substantially stronger contracting institutions in comparison with the three Scandinavian countries 
combined. However, pairwise country comparisons show that the difference is neglectable for some 
contracting institutions as well as the UK have relatively weaker contracting institutions in some 
areas. Denmark, in particular, is very close to having similar strong contracting institutions related 
to contracts and capabilities, equal levels of collaboration as well as higher levels of competition. 
As a consequence the third main hypothesis (H3a-d) is only partly supported.  
 
Findings on the links between the UK context, contracting institutions and contracting performance 
(mediation effects) are only partly supported. Initially, the differences in contracting performance 
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between the UK and Scandinavia cannot be explained in any substantially way by the total effects 
from differences in contracting institutions. Overall, the lack of insignificance for the total 
mediating effect from the four contracting institutions indicates a null finding. However, subsequent 
analysis finds that differences in the strength of some contracting institutions make differences for 
contracting performance between the UK and Scandinavia. In particular, weaker competition in the 
UK reduces the performance difference while stronger contracting capabilities and collaborative 
behaviors increase the difference. Overall, the findings support hypotheses H4c and H4d while no 
support is found for hypothesis H4a and H4b.  
 
Discussions and conclusions 
The findings sustain the idea that performance in a reformed public sector differs between radical 
reform countries in comparison with more modest reforming countries. Performance are found to be 
higher in a radical reform country where a deep contracting culture has developed and embedded 
relatively strong contracting institutions – at least within a most-likely context. However, the 
narrative is mixed with both positive and negative experiences. Sustaining sufficient competition in 
terms of well-qualified bids is indicated to be an issue in the UK whereas contracting institutions 
related to capabilities and collaborative behaviors are stronger.  
 
The relatively minor role for competition for explaining contract performance in comparison with 
the greater role of other contracting institutions is partly surprising. The shift from emphasis on 
competition toward emphasis on collaboration in UK public policies seems to be well-advised. 
Collaboration is found to be a strong driver of higher contract performance. The finding also 
indicates why Denmark while embedding very high competition doesn’t benefit much from this 
advantage.  
 
Contracting is found to perform relatively better in the deep contracting culture of the UK than in 
the three Scandinavian countries. This finding is congruent with the findings by Petersen et al. 
(2017) on the relative superior economic performance in terms of cost savings in Anglo-Saxon 
countries compared to other countries as well as the relatively poor economic performance of 
contracting out in the Scandinavia contexts of Norway found by Leiren et al. (2016) and Sweden 




However, the analysis also shows that belonging to a particular national context turns out to account 
only for a very limited (albeit statistical significant) part of the overall variation in contracting 
performance. For practical purposes the magnitude of the contributions of national context for 
explaining the variation in contracting performance is negligible compared to the four contracting 
institutions. In ranked order the substantial determinants for explaining variations in contracting 
performance are collaboration, capabilities, contracts and competition.  
 
The low ranking of competition for explaining differences in contracting performance compared to 
the three other contracting institutions are unexpected given the longstanding emphasis in the 
literature on the role of competition for contracting performance. One reason for the low ranking 
might be that the study gauges the importance of competition when a certain ‘threshold’ level of 
competitive pressures are already in place when local governments use private delivery. The 
emphasis on competition in the theoretical parts of the literature is mainly centered upon a contrast 
to a non-competitive situation when services are delivered by a (public) provider endowed with a 
monopoly, i.e. the ‘big’ gains from competition is mainly produced when service delivery shifts 
from a non-competitive to a competitive context.   
 
It is also found that the strength of key contracting institutions varies across contracting culture and 
a deep contracting culture partly can be associated with well-developed institutions which in turn 
support high-performing contracting practices. The finding is slightly modified by two important 
observations. Firstly, the level of competition in the deep contracting culture of the UK is on the 
average lower than in the three Scandinavian countries combined and at level with Norway which 
entertain the lowest level of competition among the four countries. Secondly, collaboration is 
apparently equally well-developed in the three Scandinavian countries as in the UK albeit 
collaboration is observed to be slightly lower in Sweden. The deep contracting culture is mainly 
associated with higher levels of contract management capabilities as well as formal contracts.  
   
Perspectives   
In perspective the paper provide several suggestions for further research.  
 
In contrast to the most-likely service setting for contractual governance adopted in the presented 
research, future research might focus on ‘least-likely’ settings for positive reform outcomes. A 
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focus on less likely service settings, such as various welfare services and/or services with a high 
political profile, might yield complementary results on the relative importance of contracting 
culture.   
 
Research may also adopt alternative and/or more robust research designs, measures and data were 
possible including quasi-experimental rather than non-experimental designs, longitudinal rather 
than cross-sectorial data, integrate measures of key constructs from multiple data sources as well as 
evaluating the same model with different performance measures such as register-based as well as 
perceptual measures.   
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Appendix I. Survey items 
Variables Question and items a  Response scale 
Performance  d 
 
 
Specify on a scale of 0 to 10 how satisfied or unsatisfied you are with the job (the) private 
contractor(s) carry out for your department in relation to: 
 Overall quality of maintenance operations.  
 General pricing and cost of the service provided. 
 Flexibility to change and/ or develop services if required. 
 Addressing issues and deficiencies in the service provided. 
Bipolar 11-point scale with 
end anchors c 
Competition e Do you usually get sufficient with qualified bids (competition) for tasks you tender? Unipolar 11-point scale with 
end anchors b 
Formal 
contracts e 
Specify on a scale of 0 to 10 the degree to which the following content is central in your 
relation with private contractor(s) for maintaining parks and green spaces and/ or roads: 
 Formalized and written legal clauses (e.g. a signed contract). 
 Performance specifications – describing overall goals, functionality and guidelines for 
operation and development.  
 Prescriptive specifications – based on quantities, instructions and performance measures.  
 Formal sanctions (e.g. financial penalties) for noncompliance. 
 Agreement on close collaboration and joint planning of operations and development. 
 Competence requirements (e.g. professional affiliation or qualification). 
Unipolar 11-point scale with 




Specify on a scale of 0 to 10 the degree to which you think that the following statements 
describe your department's capacity to manage private contractor(s): 
 We have sufficient organisational resources (e.g. time and staff)  
 We have sufficient experience and expertise  
 We have sufficient methods and systems (e.g. quality standards, GIS and ICT systems)  
 Our management practices and procedures are sufficient. 
Unipolar 11-point scale with 
end anchors b 
Collaborative 
relation 
On a scale of 0 to10 to what degree do you think the following statements characterize the 
relationship between your department and private contractor(s): 
 We are both of the opinion that it is necessary to co-operate in order for each of us to attain 
our goals  
 We are both prepared to make operational changes if it makes the work easier for one of the 
parties 
 We are both concerned with the other party attaining their goals 
Unipolar 11-point scale with 
end anchors b 
Internal 
provider d 
Which functions are your department responsible for?   
 Practical delivery (e.g. contractor role / day to day maintenance) 
Yes / No 
a All items translated for the purpose of this article. Original survey languages: Danish, English, Norwegian and Swedish.  
b Response categories are based on an 11 point scale with end anchors, where 0 = not at all, 10 = in very high degree. 
c Response categories are based on an 11 point scale with end anchors,  where 0 = very unsatisfied, 10 = very satisfied. 
d Question is formulated individually for respectively parks and roads. 
e Question encompasses both parks and roads.  
 
 
